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The combination of a domestic economic slow-
down and the recent worldwide rise in food
prices threatens to increase the number of
American households experiencing “food inse-
curity,” which the government defines as lacking
access to enough food for an active, healthy life 
at all times (Nord, Andrews, and Carlson 2007).
The same conditions reduce revenues and in-
crease costs for state governments (Dadayan and
Ward 2008), leaving them with few resources to
alleviate family stress. They can, however, take
advantage of state Food Stamp Program (FSP)
policy options that increase eligibility and bene-
fits. The state cost of expanding FSP is low
because the federal government pays the entire
cost of benefits and about half of state adminis-
trative expenses.
This brief focuses on the Food Stamp
Program options that particularly affect working
families, defined throughout as households with
earnings and children under age 18. Estimates
show that 63.9 percent of the individuals in
working families who qualified for benefits ac-
tually participated in the program in fiscal year
2006, representing a significant increase over par-
ticipation earlier in the decade (Wolkwitz 2008). 
The brief reviews the changing federal and
state program options and their potential effects
on working families. This review assesses eligibil-
ity rules and participation just after passage of the
2008 Farm Bill, which reauthorizes the program
and changes its name.1 The brief also examines
the Farm Bill provisions likely to have the biggest
impact on participation by working families. It
shows changes in the working-family share of
program participants over time and differences
among racial and ethnic groups and among
states. It highlights seven state policy options that
are particularly important to working families,
research findings about their impact on participa-
tion, and the extent to which states have adopted
them. The brief ends with a discussion of state
FSP policy decisions in the context of the more
general devolution of welfare programs from the
mid-1990s to the present.
Federalism and Food Stamps
The federal government and the states share
authority over the Food Stamp Program, which
serves more than 27 million people each month.
The federal government sets the program’s
income eligibility limits and benefit levels, both
of which are uniform across states except for
adjustments to reflect the higher cost of living in
Alaska and Hawaii. The federal government also
pays the full cost of benefits, all administrative
costs at the national level, and about half the
administrative costs at the state level. States
administer the program, pay the other half of
their administrative costs, and choose among var-
ious policy options that can affect eligibility and
participation. 
Welfare reform’s emphasis on work, and the
rapid reduction in the number of families receiv-
ing cash assistance during the late 1990s, drew
new attention to the factors that made low-
income households with earnings and children
ineligible for the Food Stamp Program or dis-
couraged participation by eligible working fam-
ilies (Currie 2003; Daponte, Sanders, and Taylor
1999; Zedlewski and Rader 2005). Asset limits,
set low and applied to the automobiles parents
needed to get to work, made some working fam-
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ilies ineligible for food stamps. Other working
families, including some that had left cash assis-
tance, were eligible for food stamps but did not
know it. And the burdens of enrolling and stay-
ing enrolled, including paperwork, time, and the
cost of traveling to program offices, kept some
working families that were eligible, and knew it,
from applying for food stamps. Congress and the
United States Department of Agriculture, Food
and Nutrition Service (FNS), which administers
FSP, responded by giving states new options that
could be used to address these factors. 
The 2002 Farm Bill that reauthorized the
Food Stamp Program wrote into law several
options that some states were already using under
waivers or regulations, including simplified def-
initions of income and assets and transitional
benefits for families leaving Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families, or TANF (Dean and Rosen-
baum 2003). The 2002 bill also extended the
maximum period for transitional benefits from
three to five months. 
Perhaps even more important, the 2002
Farm Bill changed the context of state decision-
making by reforming the Food Stamp Program
quality control (QC) system, which assesses bene-
fit error rates at the state level, to eliminate the
incentives that had led states to impose stricter
certification and reporting requirements on
households with earnings (Kabbani and Wilde
2003). Because the earnings of low-income fam-
ilies are volatile, determining eligibility and
benefits for working families is difficult and
error-prone. 
Under the QC system in place before the
2002 changes, states with above-average error
rates were subject to severe financial penalties. 
In FY 1999, for example, 23 states incurred $75
million in potential liabilities, led by Michigan at
$30 million. In practice, the penalties were often
waived or reduced, and states were allowed to
reinvest whatever penalties remained in improve-
ments to FSP administration rather than give the
money back to the federal government. Nonethe-
less, state officials in this period appear to have
taken the threat of penalties very seriously and
made policy decisions with that possibility in
mind (Kabbani and Wilde 2003; Rosenbaum
2000).
The new QC system established by the 2002
Farm Bill reduces the likelihood of state penal-
ties. The threshold that triggers federal action is
higher than before and states only incur a finan-
cial penalty when they have exceeded this thresh-
old in consecutive years. States that do incur
penalties may be able to reinvest up to half the
amount in administrative improvements, and the
other half may be waived if the state error rate
drops in the following year.
A number of provisions in the 2008 Farm
Bill, recently enacted over President Bush’s veto,
promise to make additional working families eli-
gible or increase the benefits working families
can claim (Rosenbaum 2008).2 Beginning in FY
2009, asset limits will be indexed for inflation
and will exclude retirement and education
accounts. The Farm Bill also removes the current
caps on the deduction for the cost of dependent
care, $200 a month for infants and $175 a
month for other children, and increases and
indexes the standard deduction available to all
participants.3
The Farm Bill modestly expands state
options by allowing them to adopt systems in
which applicants provide signatures by tele-
phone, instead of requiring written signatures
that must be delivered to food stamp offices in
person or by mail. As discussed below, the bill
also permits states to use transitional benefits
more broadly.
Working Families in 
the Food Stamp Program
Participation in the Food Stamp Program can
substantially increase the purchasing power of
working families. The average monthly benefit
for enrolled working families in FY 2006 was
$275, equivalent to 24 percent of their gross
income.4 To be eligible for this benefit, a working
family must normally have gross income at or
below 130 percent of federal poverty guidelines
(currently $2,238 a month for a family of four),
net income (after various deductions) at or below
100 percent of the guidelines ($1,721 a month),
and assets of $2,000 or less. Legal aliens in the
United States for less than five years may be ineli-
gible for benefits, and undocumented immigrants
need not apply. To actually receive benefits, a
family member must provide documentation 
that the household meets these requirements,
complete other paperwork, and visit an office
that may be hard to get to, open for limited
hours, or have an atmosphere that makes appli-
State governments can
take advantage of Food
Stamp Program policy
options that increase
eligibility and benefits.
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cants feel unwelcome (Zedlewski and Rader
2005).
Just before passage of the central measure of
welfare reform in 1996, the Personal Responsibil-
ity and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA), individuals in working families
made up less than 30 percent of all Food Stamp
Program participants (figure 1). Since then, their
share has risen to nearly 40 percent, with most of
the increase in the first few years after PRWORA.
During this period, the working family share of
Food Stamp Program participants increased
across racial and ethnic groups. The increase in
the first few years after PRWORA was particu-
larly sharp among African Americans, but the
percentage of black participants who are in work-
ing families remains a few points lower than the
overall rate of 38 percent. The working family
share of Hispanic participants has risen steadily
and is now close to 50 percent. The working fam-
ily share of program participants has also grown
among Asians and Pacific Islanders and among
American Indians and Alaska Natives, though the
time series for these groups (not shown sepa-
rately) are noisier due to smaller sample sizes.
Figure 2 shows absolute numbers for par-
ticipants in working family households and for
other participants. The number of participants in
working families fell in the late 1990s, which sug-
gests that the increased working-family share of
the caseload during this period resulted from an
even sharper decline in the numbers for other
participants, particularly families with children
and no earnings. After dipping below 6 million
during FY 1999 and 2000, the number of
working-family participants rose to just under 
10 million in FY 2006. Both weaker economic
conditions and changes in state and national pol-
icies may have contributed to this increase.
Table 1 shows state-level estimates for the 
FY 2006 share of individual participants who
were in working families (at least one child
under age 18 and earnings in the month they
were sampled). The estimates range from 13 per-
cent of individual recipients in the District of
Columbia and 18 percent in Rhode Island to 
49 percent in Idaho and 52 percent in Missouri.
All the New England states (Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
and Vermont) fall below the national level of 
38 percent on this measure.5 Variation in the
share of individuals in working households that
make up a state’s total caseload reflect differences
in FSP rules, rules for welfare programs, and, 
FIGURE 1.  Share of Food Stamp Participants in Working Families, by Race and Ethnicity, FY 1996–2006
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Source: Urban Institute analysis of Food Stamp Program quality control data.
Notes: Figures shown are three-month moving averages. Participants “in working families” live in households with at least one child under age 18 and earnings in that month. Estimates for whites and
blacks are for non-Hispanics only; estimates for Hispanics are for any race. Asians and Pacific Islanders and American Indians and Alaska Natives are not shown separately but are included in “All.”
Excludes data for Guam and Virgin Islands. Data for Louisiana (June–December 2005) and Mississippi (June–September 2005) are missing because of Hurricane Katrina.
An Urban Institute Program to Assess Changing Social Policies
4
of course, the demographic and economic profile
of the state. For example, states with relatively
larger shares of low-income working families and
states with more liberal eligibility rules for work-
ing families will tend to have larger shares of
working households in their caseloads, all else
equal.
State Differences 
in Food Stamp Program Rules
Whether a working family is eligible for food
stamps may depend on state policy choices about
vehicle rules, categorical eligibility, and transi-
tional benefits. The extent of state outreach may
determine whether an eligible family knows it
may be eligible. And what the family must do, at
what intervals, to remain in the program
depends on state decisions about certification
periods, reporting requirements, and face-to-face
interviews. 
Table 1 compares state Food Stamp
Program rules in these seven categories. In each
category, the policy option expected to be most
conducive to participation by working families is
scored as a plus (+). For vehicle rules, certifica-
tion periods, and reporting requirements, it is
also possible to identify the policy option
expected to be least conducive to participation
by working families, scored with a minus sign
(–). For five of the seven policies, at least two of
the studies discussed provide some evidence that
the policy has the expected and intended effect.
The evidence on transitional benefits is mixed,
and the impact of waiving the recertification
requirement of a face-to-face interview has not
been studied.
Vehicle Rules
Most Americans get to work by car. Under Food
Stamp Program rules, however, the market value
of an automobile above $4,650 is counted against
the household resource limit of $2,000 ($3,000 if
the household includes an elderly or disabled per-
son). The $4,650 threshold has not been adjusted
for inflation since 1996, and money that may be
owed on the vehicle is not taken into account.
Under these rules, an automobile that is reliable
enough to get a low-income parent to work may
be valuable enough to make the family ineligible
for food stamps. Ratcliffe, McKernan, and
Finegold (2007) find increased enrollment in
states that excluded vehicles from Food Stamp
Program eligibility determinations. Cody and
colleagues (2008) also find a positive effect, 
FIGURE 2.  Food Stamp Participants in Working Families and Other Participants, FY 1996–2006
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Source: Urban Institute analysis of Food Stamp Program quality control data.
Notes: Figures shown are three-month moving averages. Participants “in working families” live in households with at least one child under age 18 and earnings in that month. Excludes data for Guam
and Virgin Islands. Data for Louisiana (June–December 2005) and Mississippi (June–September 2005) are missing because of Hurricane Katrina.
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TABLE 1.  State Use of Food Stamp Program Options
Individuals in
working families, Expanded
as share of all Vehicle categorical Transitional Certification Reporting Waives
State participants rules eligibility benefits Outreach periods requirements face-to-face
Alabama 36% + + +
Alaska 42% + + +
Arizona 47% + + + + +
Arkansas 40% + + + + +
California 37% + + + +
Colorado 34% + + + +
Connecticut 25% + + + + +
Delaware 46% + + + +
District of 
Columbia 13% + +
Florida 35% + + +
Georgia 43% + + + + +
Hawaii 37% + + –
Idaho 49% +
Illinois 35% + + + +
Indiana 40% + + +
Iowa 41% + +
Kansas 44% + + + + +
Kentucky 34% + + +
Louisiana 39% + + + + +
Maine 35% + + +
Maryland 34% + + + +
Massachusetts 23% + + + + + +
Michigan 41% + + + + +
Minnesota 29% + + + –
Mississippi 38% + +
Missouri 52% + + +
Montana 41% + + + +
Nebraska 41% + + +
Nevada 38% + + +
New Hampshire 32% + + +
New Jersey 33% + +
New Mexico 48% + + + + + +
New York 31% + + + +
North Carolina 35% + + + +
North Dakota 42% + +
Ohio 36% + + + +
(Continued )
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although as the authors note, the size of the effect
is sensitive to data and assumptions. Hanratty
(2006), however, finds no significant effect. 
Although the standard policy has not been
revised, FNS has allowed states to align Food
Stamp Program vehicle rules with those for
TANF cash assistance or other programs financed
with TANF funds or counted toward a state’s
TANF maintenance of effort (MOE) require-
ment. As table 1 shows, twenty-nine states cur-
rently exclude the value of all automobiles.6
Another 16 exclude the value of at least one car,
and 6 apply limits higher than $4,650 and/or 
go by equity rather than market value. The only
place where the standard vehicle policy still
applies is the Virgin Islands.
Expanded Categorical Eligibility
National Food Stamp Program rules make house-
holds automatically eligible if everyone is receiv-
ing Supplemental Security Income, TANF cash
assistance, or other benefits or services for which
more than half the cost comes from the state’s
TANF grant or is counted toward its MOE.
Thirty-five states go further and allow receipt of
TABLE 1.  State Use of Food Stamp Program Options (Continued)
Individuals in
working families, Expanded
as share of all Vehicle categorical Transitional Certification Reporting Waives
State participants rules eligibility benefits Outreach periods requirements face-to-face
Oklahoma 41% + + + +
Oregon 37% + + + + +
Pennsylvania 34% + + + + +
Rhode Island 18% + +
South Carolina 38% + + + + +
South Dakota 46% + + – +
Tennessee 33% + + + + + +
Texas 48% + + + +
Utah 46% + + – +
Vermont 34% + + + +
Virginia 36% + + + +
Washington 36% + + + + + + +
West Virginia 34% + + +
Wisconsin 44% + + + + + +
Wyoming 46% –
Number of “+” states 29 35 18 23 21 44 20
Number of “–” states 0 2 3
Key:
Vehicle rules: +, all automobiles excluded; –, standard FSP rules (market value over $4,650 counted against asset limit)
Expanded categorical eligibility: +, categorical eligibility covers families receiving noncash assistance from TANF
Transitional benefits: +, offers transitional benefits to households leaving TANF
Outreach: +, has formal outreach program
Certification periods: +, 12 months or more for more than 50 percent of households with earnings and children; –, 3 months or less for more than 50 percent of households with earnings and children
Reporting requirements: +, simplified reporting for more than 50 percent of households with earnings and children; –, monthly reporting for more than 50 percent of households with earnings and children
Waives face-to-face: +, face-to-face interview not required for recertification (statewide only)
Sources: Individuals in working families, certification periods, and reporting requirements: Urban Institute analysis of FY 2006 Food Stamp Program quality control data. Vehicle rules, expanded
categorical eligibility, transitional benefits, outreach, and waives face-to-face: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Food Stamp Program State Options Report, 7th ed. 
(November 2007).
Note: All counts treat the District of Columbia as a state but exclude Guam and the Virgin Islands.
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benefits from other means-tested programs that
serve the purposes of the TANF block grant, as
detailed in PRWORA (table 1). Examples of such
programs include child care in Pennsylvania and
transportation assistance in Arkansas. President
Bush has repeatedly, but so far unsuccessfully,
proposed to limit categorical eligibility to recip-
ients of cash assistance, thus eliminating man-
datory eligibility for those whose services are
primarily financed by TANF or counted toward
state MOEs, as well as the broader categorical
eligibility conferred by state option. The pro-
posed changes would end eligibility for more
than 300,000 people, most of them in working
families (Dean and Rosenbaum 2007).
Ratcliffe and colleagues (2007) find that
expanded categorical eligibility increased food
stamp receipt by about 2 percentage points. Cody
and colleagues (2008) also report evidence of a
positive effect, but as with vehicle rules, the
authors find that the size of the effect is sensitive
to data and assumptions. 
Transitional Benefits
Transitional benefits are another state option that
links Food Stamp Program eligibility with TANF.
For families leaving TANF, states can freeze food
stamp benefits at the level the family received
while it was participating in TANF, plus an ad-
justment for the loss of the income from cash
assistance. This is particularly valuable to families
leaving TANF because a parent gets a job; with-
out transitional benefits, the new earnings might
reduce the family’s food stamp allocation or cause
it to become ineligible altogether. 
Before the 2002 Farm Bill, only New York
offered transitional benefits, under a waiver
authorizing the state to freeze benefits for up to
three months. The 2002 Farm Bill gave states the
option of providing up to five months of transi-
tional benefits. The 18 states with this policy
(table 1) all extend the benefits for the maximum
five months. 
The 2008 Farm Bill broadens the use of
transitional benefits by allowing states to make
them available to families leaving state-funded
cash assistance programs as well as those leaving
TANF. Some states use TANF MOE dollars to
provide such assistance to immigrants who meet
all TANF requirements except those pertaining 
to citizenship, to families exhausting their 
60 months of TANF participation under the
federal lifetime limit, or to two-parent families
that might otherwise cause the state to incur
penalties for missing TANF work participation
targets. 
Cody and colleagues (2008) suggest that the
long-term effects of transitional benefits on state
participation rates may differ from the short-term
effects: in the short run, transitional benefits keep
families leaving welfare in the Food Stamp Pro-
gram, but to the extent that they encourage
employment, as they are intended to do, transi-
tional benefits might reduce the long-term need
for food assistance. Transitional benefits did not
have a significant effect in their model. Danielson
and Klerman (2006) find that transitional bene-
fits increase participation, but transitional bene-
fits have a significant negative effect on food
stamp receipt in Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Fine-
gold’s model (2007).
Outreach
Working families are a frequent target for state
outreach efforts (Zedlewski et al. 2005). Twenty-
three states had formal outreach plans in No-
vember 2007 (table 1). Ratcliffe and coauthors
(2007) find that state-level outreach spending has
a small, lagged, positive effect on food stamp par-
ticipation. Kabbani and Wilde (2003) find that
outreach spending has a positive effect on partici-
pation by working households but no effect on
participation by nonworking households. Cody
and coauthors (2008), using the existence of a
state outreach plan rather than a spending mea-
sure as their independent variable, do not find a
significant effect.
Certification Periods
All Food Stamp Program households are assigned
a certification period, at the end of which reappli-
cation, which may include a face-to-face inter-
view, is required. States can assign certification
periods from 1 to 12 months; households where
every member is elderly or disabled can be certi-
fied for up to 24 months. Current federal regu-
lations say that “State agencies must assign the
longest certification period possible based on the
predictability of the household’s circumstances”
and that this will normally be at least six months
(7 CFR 273.10). In practice, some states assign
longer periods than others. 
The average monthly
benefit for enrolled
working families in
fiscal year 2006 was
$275, equivalent to 
24 percent of their gross
income.
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Longer certification periods encourage par-
ticipation because they lower the burden of com-
plying with program rules. Hanratty (2006),
Kabbani and Wilde (2003), and Ratcliffe and
colleagues (2007) all find that the length of certi-
fication periods significantly affects participation.
Cody and colleagues (2008), in contrast, do not
find any effect.
Before the 2002 Farm Bill, up to 40 percent
of working families were assigned short certifi-
cation periods, lasting three months or less (fig-
ure 3). Although this policy made it harder for
these families to participate, it reduced the
chances that the month-to-month changes in
earnings that many low-income working families
experience would produce costly quality control
errors in eligibility and benefits. With the new
system in place, assignment of short certification
periods to working families has nearly disap-
peared. 
Table 1 shows that in FY 2006, 21 states
assigned certification periods of 12 months or
more to more than half their households with
children and earnings. Utah and Wyoming, how-
ever, continue to assign certification periods of 
3 months or less to more than half of their work-
ing families.
Simplified Reporting
Within the certification period, a Food Stamp
Program household is required to report its mem-
bers’ income and employment, changes in which
might lead to changes in eligibility or benefit
amounts. States can and do assign different
reporting requirements to different households.
As with certification periods, we would expect
stricter requirements to be associated with re-
duced participation. Danielson and Klerman
(2006), Ratcliffe and coauthors (2007), and
Cody and coauthors (2008) all find some evi-
dence that more lenient reporting requirements
were associated with higher participation.
Hanratty (2006) does not find a significant effect. 
The standard policy is monthly reporting.
Even before PRWORA, however, states were able
to modify this by adopting change reporting,
under which a household was only required to
report if the change exceeded a threshold of $25.7
In 1999, FNS indicated it would approve waivers
that allowed states to adopt quarterly reporting
for earners. The following year, FNS indicated it
would approve waivers for “simplified reporting,”
under which earners would be only required to
report every six months as long as gross income
FIGURE 3.  Certification Periods for Working Families, FY 1996–2006
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Notes: Figures shown are three-month moving averages. “Working families” are households with at least one child under age 18 and earnings in the month. Excludes data for Guam and Virgin Islands.
Data for Louisiana (June–December 2005) and Mississippi (June–September 2005) are missing because of Hurricane Katrina.
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policy options in all
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did not exceed 130 percent of federal poverty
guidelines. Simplified reporting appears to place
less burden on participating families than the
other reporting options. 
In FY 2006, 44 states had simplified report-
ing for more than half the working families
receiving food stamps (table 1). Hawaii, Minne-
sota, and South Dakota require monthly report-
ing for more than half their working family
caseloads. Among the other states, California
relies primarily on quarterly reporting, and North
Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming use various forms
of change reporting.
Face-to-Face Interviews
One requirement that makes recertification oner-
ous is the face-to-face interview; just scheduling
the interview can be difficult for parents who
work during the hours the Food Stamp Program
office is normally open and are also responsible
for child care. In 2003, FNS announced that
states with below-average QC error rates would
be eligible for waivers of the requirement of a
face-to-face interview at recertification. FNS
broadened the availability of the option in 2006,
when it indicated that only states in their first
year of liability status would be excluded (Foley
2006). FNS liberalized its standards once again in
2007, when it announced that state eligibility for
these waivers would no longer be tied to a state’s
QC error rates at all (Foley 2007). 
Twenty states currently have statewide
waivers that allow them to conduct recertification
interviews by phone (table 1). None of the stud-
ies reviewed for this brief tested the effects of this
policy option. 
Discussion
The variability in states’ adoption of FSP options
means that working families and other partici-
pants face different program rules depending on
where they live. Washington is the only state that
has adopted the most expansive policy options in
all seven categories (table 1). Massachusetts, New
Mexico, Tennessee, and Wisconsin come next,
with positive scores in six categories. The high
score for Tennessee suggests that southern states,
typically less generous on TANF (Finegold
2005), do not necessarily adopt less generous
Food Stamp Program options. Notably, all the
southern states use simplified reporting.8 Three
western states—Hawaii, Idaho, and Wyoming—
make the least use of the options shown in table 1.
Opponents of PRWORA expressed fears that
increased state flexibility under TANF would cre-
ate a race to the bottom, in which states compete
to make themselves unattractive to the poor by
reducing benefits or imposing harsh sanctions. A
decade later, researchers continue to argue over
whether there has been a race to the bottom
under welfare reform.9
Federalism has been more clearly benign in
the context of the Food Stamp Program, which
enrolls many more people than TANF and
spends much more money. In a race to the bot-
tom, states looking to drive away low-income
families would not act to expand the Food Stamp
Program, as they have done. States remain free to
assign short certification periods and demand
monthly reports or to rely on the standard rules
for vehicles and categorical eligibility, and states
are not required to waive face-to-face interviews,
offer transitional benefits, or engage in outreach.
Yet every state except Wyoming has chosen to
adopt at least one of the expansionary options
shown in table 1. Even that conservative state has
adopted change reporting to reduce reporting
burdens and increased its vehicle exemption from
the standard $4,650 to $12,000. 
With the federal government paying the
entire cost of benefits and sharing administrative
expenses, states have strong financial incentives
for encouraging participation, now that the QC
system no longer penalizes them for enrolling
working families. Policymakers in the states may
also be influenced by the framing of the Food
Stamp Program as “work support” rather than
“welfare,” which has helped the program to not
only survive PRWORA but grow, even as TANF
cash assistance continues to shrink. Use of the
state options discussed here is consistent with this
conception of the program, and to the extent that
the options do increase participation among
working families, they strengthen the evidence
for it. 
Notes
1. The 2008 Farm Bill changes the name of the program to
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP),
effective October 1, 2008.
2. The official name of the bill is the Food, Conservation,
and Energy Act of 2008 (PL 110-246). The relevant 
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provisions of this bill and the food stamp provisions of
prior law (the Food Stamp Act of 1977, as amended)
together constitute the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008. 
3. The change in the standard deduction will only benefit
one-, two-, and three-person households because the stan-
dard deduction for larger households is already indexed for
inflation under current law. The 2002 Farm Bill made the
standard deduction equal to the greater of $134 (in the
continental United States) or 8.31 percent of the federal
poverty guidelines, which vary by household size and are
adjusted each year for inflation. Under this formula, the
standard deduction for the continental United States has
remained at $134 for households of one to three people,
but it increased from $134 for all households in FY 2002
to $143 for four-person households, $167 for five-person
households, and $191 for households of six or more in 
FY 2008. The 2008 Farm Bill raises the minimum value of
the standard deduction from $134 to $144 in FY 2009.
This change will immediately increase monthly benefits
for three-person working families by four or five dollars a
month, with a greater impact in subsequent years
(Rosenbaum 2008).
4. Urban Institute analysis of Food Stamp Program quality
control data, FY 2006.
5. Urban Institute analysis of Food Stamp Program quality
control data, FY 2006. The 38 percent represents the
national proportion of individual participants living in
working families. Another 38 percent of individual partic-
ipants live in households with children and no earnings, 
3 percent live in households with earnings and no chil-
dren, and 21 percent live in households with neither chil-
dren nor earnings. At the household level, 24 percent of
participating households are working families, 28 percent
have children and no earnings, 5 percent have earnings
and no children, and 43 percent have no children and no
earnings. These estimates, which exclude participants in
Guam and the Virgin Islands, differ slightly from those in
Wolkwitz (2007), which include participants in the two
territories.
6. All counts of states with particular policies include the
District of Columbia as a state but do not include Guam
or the Virgin Islands.
7. Policy changes since 1996 have raised the threshold for
unearned income to $50 and allowed states to seek waivers
that raise the threshold for earnings to $100.
8. This is so whether one defines the South as the 11 states of
the Confederacy (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia) or uses the Census Bureau
concept, which also includes Delaware, the District of
Columbia, Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, and West
Virginia.
9. See the articles and comments in Social Science Quarterly
87:4 (December 2006).
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